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ARBITRATION BY JURY*
The title of this paper suggests a doubt as to whether trial by
jury accomplishes the results for winch it was intended, and this
may smack of heresy
If it seems presumptious to question the wisdom of the ages, we
may remember that the wisdom of the ages has seldom proved
enduring.
Other legal institutions, the products of the wisdom of past ages,
have flourished and declined and disappeared, because unsuited to
changed conditions.
Not so long ago in our legal history, trial by battle was accepted
by lawyers and laymen as a rational method of settling a disputed
land title. But there were skeptics in those days, and finally it
dawned upon mankind that there was little correlation between the
justice of a cause and the ability of the champion who with lance
and battle axe defended it. When it was perceived that such a trial
settled nothing beyond the relative ability of the contenders, it
passed into the limbo of things forgotten.
Trial by wager of law, in which the issue was settled by the formal
oath of the party and his compurgators, was held in high esteem
and lauded as one of the great constitutional rights of the subject,
guaranteed to him by the ancient law of the land.
But the skeptics insisted that an oath in support of self interest
could not be relied on, and trial by wager of law passed into legal
history
It would be unfortunate, then, if any legal institution were too
sacred for questioning. Lawyers are apt to accept trial by jury as
a part of the creed winch requires them to presume that theories are
founded on fact. They know that they lose many cases that they
ought not to lose, and win cases that they ought not to win, but this
rarely troubles them so long as they can maintain a fair average of
successes.
It is becoming more apparent every day that the business world
and laymen in general are not satisfied with the administration of
the law by the courts. They believe with some justification that the
enforcement of their rights is too uncertain and precarious.
We see this growing dissatisfaction with the results obtained
through resort to the courts reflected in the creation and multipli*Address delivered at the Annual State Bar Association Convention.
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cation of boards and commissions to handle special types of problems, and more significantly, in voluntary arbitration tribunals in
various lines of industry and business.
Hence it may not be inappropriate to consider trial by jury as
now conducted and see how well or ill it performs its function.
All sorts of surveys of the courts have been proposed and made
by those who delight in statistics, but the masses of figures throw
little light on the real problem. Exact information is probably not
attainable, but from our general experience we may form a pretty
fair estimate of the efficiency and practical utility of our present
scheme for the settlement of controversies by law.
Any rational legal solution of the problems involved in a controversy requires an answer to two questions What are the facts
involved? What is the law applicable to such facts? Obviously the
facts must be ascertained before any rule can be applied, and some
rule must be found or made, if the matter is to be settled by law
More difficult and complex questions can scarcely be conceived, and
yet an attempt to answer them is the daily task of every court from
Maine to Washington.
Trial lawyers have grown so familiar with the methods employed
that they are apt to lose sight of the almost insuperable difficulties
involved, which are apparently even less appreciated by their
brethren of the profession who have largely lost contact with the
court room in the devotion of their talents to the organization and
financing of business projects.
These business experts seemingly fail to realize that the business
and corporate structures they plan may crash like a faulty bridge
when a vital clash of interests occurs, if it should be settled on some
other basis than that on which they based their calculations. Can
they anticipate with any certainty the actual determination of the
facts? Can they predict the rule of law that will be applied ?
Every lawyer, therefore, whether primarily engaged in the trial
of causes or in the field of business engineering, has a vital interest
in understanding the inherent difficulties involved in the determmation of disputed questions of law and fact, and in considering
whether to have any reliable process or technique for their solution.
In other words, are cases decided by the application of known or
discoverable rules to the facts as ascertained with reasonable certainty 9 Or is this an unattainable theory, which breaks down in
practice, so that the results of a trial too frequently represent anything but the application of the law to the facts that actually happened'
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Perfection cannot be attained in any human institution. Errors
are bound to occur under any system. But if our system fails in
a large percentage of cases, we may well agree with an eminent
English judge in the late sixteen hundreds, who is reported to have
remarked, in passing on a motion for a new trial for misconduct of
the jury in deciding a case by the flip of a coin, that they were about
as likely to reach a correct result by that method as any other.
Every lawyer, from the recently admitted graduate of the law
school to the senior justice of the Supreme Court, knows that there
are some uncertainties in the law, and the frequency of majority
and dissenting opinions emphasizes the fact that there is often room
for a difference of opimon. But in spite of such obvious uncertainties, law teachers and practitioners alike commonly assume that
by and large the law is reasonably certain and can be relied on with
considerable confidence to settle rights and obligations when conflicting interests clash as they do in vast numbers of suits that clog
the dockets of our courts.
Tis comfortable assumption is based on our knowledge and
experience that in a great variety of fields, given a specific group
of facts, the decision of the courts will follow with almost automatic
certainty If A should slap B's face, or appropriate his chattels,
or elope with his wife, we can predict the legal consequence with
about the same degree of certainty as that of the astronomer who
calculates the hour of the next eclipse.
We can be pretty sure that a will attested by one witness only
can not be relied on to carry out the testator's purpose, or that
an instrument of a given tenor lacks the quality of negotiability
Such a list of certainties could easily be extended beyond the limits
of this paper. And when the American Law Institute is through
with its restatements, we shall doubtless have a great many matters
of law comfortably settled for the time being, though much of it will
not stay settled very long. Littleton and Coke would be sadly puzzled by the present state of the law of real property Chitty might
have some difficulties with the Washington Code of Civil Procedure. And Story and Parsons would probably be surprised if they
could read Williston's Restatement of Contracts.
In the settled fields, the law teacher may analyze and classify and
predict with certainty, but it is only the certainty of logic-an "if,
then" certainty So the practitioner may safely advise his client
to act or refrain, if and provided the facts are conceded to be thus
and so. But the settled fields are not the ones that trouble appellate
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courts. They are constantly called on to deal with the broader unsettled frontier. The facts in Smith v. Jones, argued and submitted
yesterday, are not precisely the same as those presented in Johnson
v. Brown decided ten years ago. Is the difference material? Who
can say until the opinion is handed down? Will the reasons which
led to the decision in Johnson v. Brown influence the court to hold
the difference immaterial 9 Would the court, as an original proposition, decide Johnson v. Brown the same way today that it did ten
years ago I Conditions have changed in many ways since then, and
so has the personnel of the court. A wave of prosperity has been
followed by a wave of depression. Business methods and practices
that were thought safe enough under more favorable conditions have
brought ruin and confusion. New safeguards may be needed.
Reasons which strongly appealed to the gentlemen -who occupied
the bench in 1921 may not prove equally convincing to their eminent
successors in 1931. And so, the difference in facts, though slight,
may furnish an easy way to a distinction or a "diversity" as the
English judges used to say in a world that was not changing as fast
as ours.
If, shortly after the decision in Pennoyer v. Neff (95 U S. 714,
24 L. Ed. 565), in which the court unqualifiedly denied the power
of a state to bind a non-resident except by personal service of process
upon him within its borders, a highway accident had occurred with
ordinary horse-drawn vehicles, and it had been sought to obtain personal jurisdiction of the non-resident traveler by some form of substituted or constructive notice, it is hardly conceivable that the Supreme Court would have sustained the claim. The court was firmly
committed to the doctrine that the powers and process of the state
could not extend beyond its borders. But in the intervening years
motor cars came and multiplied until they filled the highways, and
the east and the west met and mingled. New conditions demanded
new treatment. The touring motorist became a menace to local secur
ity And so a highway accident caused by the non-resident motorist
gave us the decision in Pawlosksv. Hess (253 Mass. 478, 149 N.E. 122
[aff. 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091] ), recognizing the
power of the state to summon the defendant from another jurisdiction.
The possible combinations of facts are beyond the realm of calculation. The facts in Smith v. Jones are rarely, if ever, quite the same
as those before the court in the prior cases. Every case is likely to
present a new problem, because of differences m the specific facts,
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or in changed conditions. For the eternal new problem there can
be no settled or established rule. Nor can we rely on general principles. Justice Holmes has warned us that general principles do
not settle concrete cases. We have the general principles of due
process, but it leaves us groping when we inquire what is due process
as applied to the new situation. There will probably be room for a
difference in opinion.
One thing is settled, that the court must decide each new problem
when it arises in an actual controversy
The decision is the product of the judge's general legal training,
his habits of thought, his philosophy of life, his ideas of fairness
and expediency, and his grasp of social and economic needs. He may
not be conscious of all the factors that led to his conclusion, and
they rarely appear in the opinion which is more apt to be framed
in terms of sylogistie reasoning from prior cases which are really
not decisive. It is not uncommon to find the majority and minority
opinions reaching different results from the same decisions. What
we call rules of law in reality are the generalizations which we lawyers make from our study of past decisions to aid us in forecasting
the decision on a somewhat similar state of facts. If we have taken
into account the true reasons back of the prior decisions, and have
made due allowance for changing conditions and changing ideas,
and have not generalized too broadly, we may hope with some
confidence that the courts will accept our solution of the new problem and make it the law of that ease.
If the law is inherently uncertain in the sense that every day
claims and defenses are made on the basis of combinations of fact for
which there are no binding precedents, there is no escape from the
difficulty which must be realized and faced. The same difficulty
exists for the boards and commissions as for the courts. The same
difficulties arise whether we are dealing with the unwritten common law or the written code. New problems must be solved by the
same judicial process. No rules of procedure or method of trial can
help us here. The only aid must come from a better understanding
of what the courts have done and why they did it, from a more
comprehensive grasp of the judicial process as the courts have
labored to reach a wise and just result under the conditions as they
existed at the time. Adequate training for such problems is the
task that confronts your great University Law School. Whether
we like it or not, the uncertainly in the law is one of the risks we
must assume.
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In the attempt to adjust law to life under modern complicated
conditions, the decisions more and more have turned on distinctions
based on small but important differences in the facts. This mass of
decisions represents the most complex body of substantive law that
the world has ever known. The courts have taken into account the
unspoken thoughts of men. They have made the consequences of
an act depend on the intention with which it was done. If such
a body of law is actually enforced-if it really determines our rights
and liabilities, the facts must be ascertained with the utmost accur
acy and precision. It is idle to have different rules for different
states of fact, if we cannot be reasonably sure which state of facts
existed. What sort of machinery have we for this delicate and difficult task 9 We have a system of pleading theoretically designed to
make clear the question of fact to be determined and give fair notice
of the real nature of the claims and defences, but the decisions give
rise to doubts as to whether these objects have generally been attained.
The common count under the code is no more informative than
it was at common law a century ago. When a complaint for the
recovery of real property alleges title or ownership as a fact, which
is put in issue by a general denial, the real issues are no more disclosed than they were under the ancient system when John Doe declared on a fictitious demise, and alleged that Richard Roe, the
casual ejector, entered and ousted him.
The code scheme for the joinder of causes of action may produce a
more complicated trial than our ancestors ever attempted. The
attempt to fuse law and equity, so highly praised by some commentators, has resulted in many instances in turning over the judgment
and discretion of the chancellor to a lay jury ill-fitted to exercise it.
We have an elaborate set of rules for the exclusion of various
kinds of evidence thought to be too unreliable or too productive of
prejudice, with innumerable qualifications and exceptions, which
test the learning of the trial judge, and occupy the time of appellate
courts in such vain struggles as those involved in the attempt to
draw a line between what is, and what is not, a part of the "res
gestae. "
We have shadowy distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate
cross-examination. The rules of evidence doubtless keep out many
items of information of which it is better that a jury should remain
in ignorance. But after all it may be doubted whether the exclusion
of the improper question is really very helpful. It is more than
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likely that the jury guess the forbidden answer and view the successful objector with unwarranted suspicion.
We have endless rules of practice governing the various steps in
the trial until the final submission of the ultimate questions to
the jury But whether they have any appreciable effect on the outcome may be debatable. According to accepted theory, the jury
weigh the evidence and from it determine the facts, to which they
apply the rule formulated by the court, so that the verdict represents
the product of the law and the facts. Disregarding for the moment
a large class of cases in which we turn over the whole problem of
law and fact to the jury, as in questions of negligence, where they
are to determine not only what acts the parties did and under what
conditions, but also whether they were culpable, the theory requires
the judge to determine the rule to be applied to various possible
combinations of fact, and by hs instructions to direct the jury,
what verdict to return according to the facts as they may find them
from the evidence. This theory requires us to assume that the jury
proceeds by the use of reason and experience to determine the
facts and return a verdict in accordance with the instructions of
the court. Are cases generally so decided as a matter of fact?
Undoubtedly we go through the ritual of instructing the jury that
if they believe and find from a preponderance of the evidence that
thus and so and this and that took place, they should return a verdict for the plaintiff, unless they further find so and so, in which
case the verdict must be for the defendant, provided that
something else did not take place, and send them out to consider
their verdict. And there we must leave them, for the law preserves
the secrets of the jury room from prying investigators, and we cannot be present at their deliberations.
Post mortem accounts of what took place in the jury room and
how the decision was reached are none too reliable, but experience
in trial work will enable us to reconstruct the scene we could not
witness.
For the last three hundred years trial courts have been dissatisfied with the work of the jury and frankly skeptical as to its value.
As Chief Justice Vaughan remarked in Bwshell's case in 1670,
(Freem. K. B. 1, 6 State Tr. 999, Vaugn, 135,) "Surely this latter age did not first discover that the verdicts of juries were
many times not according to the judge's opinion and liking." In
the transition period which ended with the seventeenth century,
while the ancient power of the jury to decide the facts on their

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
own knowledge without evidence or contrary to the evidence was
gradually giving way to the new idea that verdicts ought to be based
on the evidence, the jury became a serious problem for the courts.
The system of special pleading which attained the greatest development in the time of Lord Coke, enabled the court to decide many
questions on demurrer, but was of little use where an issue of fact
was submitted to the jury who still had a free hand in deciding on
what they knew or had heard or nght surmise. An interesting
chapter could be written on the hundred years of struggle to gain
some control of the jury and thereby obtain more rational verdicts.
In 1684 the Court of King's Bench felt compelled to disclaim the
power to set aside a verdict against the evidence, since under the
old theory the jury might have found it on their own knowledge.
In 1660 a demurrer to the evidence was taken as admitting all the
facts provable under the pleadings, because the jury might find
them of their own "connusance."
In 1670, where the trial judge
had committed the jurors for contempt in disregarding his instructions and finding against the "plain and manifest" evidence, the
court in bane discharged them because the judge must instruct
hypothetically, and the jury were the sole and exclusive judges of
the facts. But in 1697, we find Lord Holt announcing the new doctrine that juries must act with the aid and assistance of the judge
and in accordance with his directions. By the middle of the eighteenth century the power of the court to direct a verdict for insufficient evidence was firmly established.
A few years later Lord Mansfield tells us that trial by jury
would be an impossible method of administering justice but for the
power of the court to set aside verdicts which were clearly erroneous. In the period then between 1670 and 1770, the English courts
had gained considerable control over the jury
And this control appears to have been reasonably effective in the
comparatively simple controversies which for the most part then
claimed the attention of the courts. The power to direct the verdict
where the evidence would not fairly and reasonably warrant the necessary finding eliminated large numbers of cases from consideration
by the jury The power to aid the jury by making clear to them
what the disputed questions of fact were, the bearing of the evidence
on these points, and its strength or weakness, had a marked tendency
to lead the jury to a rational conclusion. And finally the liberal
exercise of the power to grant new trials for verdicts against the
weight of the evidence, furnished reasonable protection against

ARBITRATION BY JURY
irrational or arbitrary decisions. So far as we can judge from the
reported cases the scheme thus developed at the close of the eighteenth century represents trial by jury at its best and under the most
favorable conditions. Controversies were comparatively simple because life and business had not yet grown complex. Judges of
marked ability dominated the trial and exercised their powers to
make it a rational method of determining the facts and applying
the law.
As a natural result of the break with England, a prejudice grew
up on this side of the Atlantic against the English institution which
magnified the office of the judge and nnunnmed the function of the
layman in the administration of the law
This prejudice seems to account for the changes which occurred
in so many of the states. The democratic idea, carried to an extreme, is responsible for constitutional or statutory provisions in a
number of the states, making jury the judges of both the law and
the fact in criminal cases.
Practically the same result has been achieved in civil cases by
the common statutory or constitutional provision, such as you have
in the state of Washington, limiting the judge to a statement of the
law by written instructions, and stripping him of the hard-earned
power to discuss the evidence, and thereby aid the jury to discover
the truth and come to a sensible conclusion.
This is the prevailing scheme under which we solemnly go through
a ritual and piously hope for a niracle, though in less practical
fields we have ceased to believe in niracles.
The accurate determination of facts in a case of real dispute is
probably the most difficult task that man can undertake. The
scientist knows the difficulty of ascertaining the truth about natural
phenomena and may spend weeks and months in weighing, measuring and checking to be sure of his facts.
Yet his work is simple as compared with that of the investigator
who seeks to discover the truth about human conduct and behavior,
where large interests are at stake.
The material to be weighed is for the most part human testimony,
whose unreliability has always been sensed, but not fully appreciated until the psychologist checked some of the errors of perception and recollection. Who can estimate the power of suggestions,
or the effects of interest and bias 7 Cross-examination may discredit the accurate account as well as the inaccurate. The witness
is called on to communicate his information under distracting con-
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ditioms. The difficulties of communication are enormous. A
statement which means one thing to the speaker may mean something
vastly different to the hearer. Protracted examination and crossexamination may leave a most hazy impression of what the witness
really said. The inferences to be drawn from a multitude of doubtful circumstances are as uncertain as the shifting wind. The attempt
to determine the truth must be carried on under the pressure and
stress of a trial.
The task demands the wisdom of Solomon and we assign it to
twelve men from the street, usually without previous experience in
such an undertaking. They need expert advice and assistance, but
they must struggle with the partisan arguments of zealous counsel.
From half told tales, left fragmentary and incomplete because some
rule of evidence has shut out the balance, jurors are expected to
sift out the wheat from the chaff, and "a true verdict make according to the law and the evidence."
Do they succeed in this impossible taskq The lawyer's creed requires him to believe so, but reason should make him a skeptic.
It may be useless to argue that trial by jury has survived its usefulness, and is as unsuited to the rational determination of complex
disputes under modern conditions as the trial by wager of law which
it supplanted, because sentiment may be stronger than reason.
The jury has been embalmed in the Constitution, and we have
been taught from early youth to believe that it is essential to the
administration of justice, though we know very well that equity
cases are handled quite satisfactorily without it. If the suit is to
set aside a trade for fraud, we do not fear that the judge will suddenly become an irrational tyrant. But if the plaintiff elects
to let the trade stand and sue for damages for the same alleged fraud,
the jury is our refuge from judicial oppression.
If the jury is likely to remain with us for a long time to come, it is
important to realize that as trials are now conducted in most of the
state courts, complicated cases are not decided by the application
of rules of law to the actual facts, because average laymen lack the
necessary experience and ability to evaluate the evidence and deter
mine the facts. They likewise lack the necessary training to under
stand a complicated series of written hypothetical instructious
framed by counsel to test the accuracy of the trial judge, rather
than for the enlightenment of the jury
Of course, there are fairly simple cases, involving few questions,
in which juries do succeed in determining the facts, and understand
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and apply the instructions. But if any of you think that the inability of the jury to understand and apply the instructions in a very
large class of cases has been exaggerated, you may test it on your
next door neighbor by reading to him the whole set of instructions in
any moderately complicated case, and then cross-examining to discover how well he understands what he would be required to determine as a juror in that case. Unless the subject of such an experiment has distinctly more ability than most law students, the result
of such a test is a foregone conclusion.
If the jury are unable to determine the actual facts and do not
understand the law as announced by the instructions, the best they
can do is to come to some agreement on what they regard as substantially fair and right between the parties under all the doubtful
circumstances. If verdicts in complex cases represent some sort
of a compromise according to the juries' general notion of fairness,
then clearly the case is not settled by rules of law, certain or uncertain, but by arbitration, and the field of law is limited to the cases
where there are practically no questions for the jury
In many fields we abandon the theory of settling right by rules,
because we actually leave both the facts and the rule to the jury, as
when we define negligence as what a reasonably prudent man would,
or would not, have done under all the circumstances. The reasonably
prudent man is a fiction-a mere conception. He does not exist in
the objective world. Hence the jurors must determine from their
own general experience what they think the real individual in question ought, or ought not to have done. So when we leave to a jury
such matters as reasonable time, reasonable notice, and the like.
At one time judges decided the proper construction of an alleged
defamatory publication, and so they do today, if the meaning is
plain and unambiguons. But if the meaning is doubtful, we pass
it on to the jury to arbitrate. Lawyers spend years in the study of
decisions. And appellate courts toil and rack their brains to formulate rules to define the rights and liabilities of men in their
various relations and dealings, all to little purpose when vital contests are settled by the general notions of twelve average laymen.
We lawyers may be satisfied with an unworkable theory, but the
bnsiness man is becoming dissatisfied, and some day we shall be
forced to give him something better than arbitration by jury
EDWARD W HINTON.*
*Professor of Law, University of Chicago.

